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seemed to be three competing methods:
gaseous diffusion, thermal separation,
and electromagnetic separation. Each
method had its advocates and its virtues. None was proven. While the scientific community dithered over the
best technical method, Groves charged
in and, with real managerial brass, initiated simultaneous and parallel development of all three separation methods,
making the largest bet on the gaseousdiffusion method at Oak Ridge.
As the engineering worked out, using
the partially enriched product from the
thermal and the electromagnetic separation processes as feedstock for gaseous diffusion gave accelerated results,
and the enriched uranium was ready on
time for the bomb.
Initially, there were two quite different
design approaches to building the
bomb. The most obvious was the gun
assembly technique, in which two
subcritical masses of enriched uranium
were explosively driven and held together until nuclear fission began and
was sustained. This design became the
“Little Boy” bomb that was dropped on
Hiroshima in the world’s first atomic
attack.
However, theory held that the use of
plutonium would produce a far more
efficient means of nuclear detonation.
Plutonium is an artificial element, bred
in a uranium-fueled reactor that is
formed into a hollow sphere and
implosively crushed with high explosives until a nuclear detonation occurs.
This proved to be a demanding technical problem requiring massive industrial sites for plutonium production at
Hanford, Washington, and nearly all
the talent at Los Alamos to calculate
and form the sphere and the surrounding high explosives.
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Again, Groves made the call, and both
avenues were followed, at great cost,
until the TRINITY test at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, proved the plutonium
implosion, which was used in the “Fat
Man” bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, historians have devoted nearly as much energy
to debating who made the decision to
use the bomb as was released in the
atomic explosions. Norris goes into this
in some detail, looking specifically at
Groves’s role in decision making. He
concludes that, as is commonly the case
with large weapons development projects in wartime, the momentum of the
project drove the outcome. The bomb
was ready, an invasion of Japan looked
to be murderously costly, momentum
carried the day, and the bomb was
dropped on Japan.
Norris’s book is a fine complement to
Richard Rhodes’s The Making of the
Atomic Bomb (1986), in which Rhodes
covers the physics of the bomb. Both
books chronicle events that changed the
world.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE

Joint Warfare Analysis Center
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The tank constitutes perhaps the most
readily identifiable symbol of land warfare. From its initial appearance during
World War I to the final stage of the
Gulf War, its considerable impact on
the outcome of some of last century’s
most significant wars is not in doubt.
Whether battles were fought on the
plains of Eastern Europe or in the deserts
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of the Middle East, the opponent that
made better use of the tank generally
emerged victorious. In the early
twenty-first century, the tank remains
the dominant instrument of land warfare. Indeed, the fact that the world’s
most powerful armies—including those
of the United States, Germany, Israel,
Russia, and China—continue to organize their ground forces around the
tank strongly suggests that its preeminent position is unlikely to be challenged any time soon.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the tank has
been the focus of a substantial amount
of literature. Most studies of the tank fit
into at least one of three basic categories: describing the tank’s actual part in
a particular war, analyzing its operational role in a particular army, or assessing the general theory behind
armored warfare. Studies that address
the tank’s past across time and space—
indeed, that go beyond the narrow confines of the battlefield itself—are rather
rare. This paucity of studies is apparently what spurred Patrick Wright, a
professor of modern cultural studies in
Great Britain, to produce this accessible, if flawed, history of the tank in the
twentieth century.
Wright adopts a chronological approach to his subject. He begins with
the first tentative use of the tank by the
British on the western front during the
First World War. He reasonably implies
that the tank had a certain shock value
on the battlefield but that it did not
contribute in any meaningful way to
Germany’s eventual defeat. The tank really came into its own during the interwar period. One of the best chapters in
this book traces the evolving military
philosophies of the major European armies during this era, especially the
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German and Russian preference for
maneuver warfare, with the tank as a
central component of the “combined
arms” team. World War II, he agrees,
demonstrated just how dominant the
tank could be on the mechanized battlefield, most astonishingly in the hands
of the Germans on both the Western
and Eastern Fronts and, later, in the
hands of the Soviets as they drove into
Central Europe.
The tank continued to be a “winning
weapon” in the postwar world too, as
Wright acknowledges in his discussion
of the Israeli experience with armored
warfare in the Arab-Israeli wars from
the 1956 Sinai campaign through the
1967 Six-Day War, to the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. Among the most stimulating material in the book is Wright’s description of Major General Israel Tal’s
philosophy of armored warfare, which
resulted in the design and construction
of the innovative Merkava tank. Tal, of
course, is the Jewish state’s most highly
regarded armored warfare specialist.
Wright also traces the tank’s part in the
Gulf War and muses about its potential
utility in an age of “digital” combat. All
in all, Wright manages to convey a
sense of the tank’s contribution to war
in the twentieth century.
Yet this book still suffers from a curiously unbalanced presentation. While it
is surely legitimate for the author to
write a history of the tank that goes beyond its successes and failures on the
battlefield—one that delves into the
tank’s broader cultural relevance—
Wright appears to have forgotten that
its primary influence has always been
on the battlefield itself. Thus, on the
one hand, undeniably major tank battles, like those that occurred at Kursk
during the Second World War and in
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the Sinai during the Yom Kippur War,
are examined in a cursory fashion. On
the other hand, undeniably minor episodes in the tank’s past, like the defacement of a memorial to Soviet troops in
postcommunist Czechoslovakia, are the
recipients of lavish coverage (relatively
speaking). Wright may favor cultural
over military affairs, but this sort of
bias should not serve as a license to
present a skewed picture of history.
Furthermore, the author writes from a
left-wing perspective, which he is honest enough to admit frankly. Such a
perspective is not inherently objectionable; however, when it leads to dubious
judgments about what to incorporate as
part of the tank’s history, it becomes a
problem. Thus he includes a long digression that probes in excruciating detail
J. F. C. Fuller’s bizarre Weltanschauung
and obnoxious racism. It would have
been sufficient for Wright simply to
mention in passing that, whatever
Fuller’s insights into armored warfare,
he was also an unsavory character with
extreme right-wing views. Likewise,
Wright spends the better part of a chapter examining a storage contraption for
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homeless people that bears only a superficial resemblance to a tank. This
specific detour seems intended to chide
the United States for its treatment of
the less fortunate rather than to illuminate the tank’s cultural relevance. A historical treatise, to put it bluntly, should
not be used as a vehicle for airing political views.
These criticisms should not be taken to
mean that Wright’s book is ultimately
unrewarding. To the contrary, it can be
consulted with profit by anyone who
has an interest in the tank. The book is,
after all, well written, well organized,
and filled with fascinating tidbits of information. However, it must be approached with a degree of caution. It is
not the judicious and dispassionate account that one would expect from a
professional observer but instead a polemic against a weapon and the ends to
which man has put it. The book should
be read with that notion firmly in
mind.
DAVID RODMAN

Dix Hills, New York
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